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AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JURY 
KIMBERLY A. MOTTLEY, DAVID ABRAMI, 
AND DARRYL K. BROWN* 
I.  JURISDICTION OF THE JURY 
A. Jurisdiction of the Jury 
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed in the United States Constitution and 
reflects an early commitment to the jury as a tool to limit government 
oppression.  The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury.1 
While this jury right originally applied only to federal courts, the Supreme 
Court in recent decades has held that “trial by jury in criminal cases is 
fundamental to the American system of justice” and, therefore, the right 
extends to state criminal courts as well.2  While some cases describe the right 
as an absolute one, a strict reading of the Constitutional text may indicate an 
absolute right to trial by jury in all cases,3 the Supreme Court has read the 
clause to guarantee a jury trial only for defendants accused of sufficiently 
serious offenses.  For reasons of cost and time-efficiency, “so-called ‘petty’ 
offenses may be tried without a jury.”4  Courts have struggled with where to 
place the dividing line between offenses warranting a jury trial and those 
dubbed “petty” offenses.  Initially, determinations were made through a focus 
 
* Darryl Brown is Assistant Professor, and Kimberly Mottley and David Abrami are Class of 
2001 graduates of Washington & Lee University School of Law.  This paper was prepared for 
ISISC conference in May 1999. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1980) (extending Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right to state courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 3. United States v. Titsworth, 422 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D. Neb. 1976) (“every person charged 
with a crime has an absolute and fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial, and it is the duty 
of the courts, and also the government, to insure that this right is safeguarded and preserved at all 
times”). 
 4. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969). 
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on the common law treatment of the offense and its inherent nature.5  Recent 
decisions have instead used more objective indications of seriousness of the 
crime, as judged by the legislature.  The criterion most closely aligned with 
this indication is the maximum authorized penalty one might receive upon 
conviction of the crime.6  “Penalty” in this context is not limited to the 
maximum prison term listed in the criminal sanction, but may include other 
penalties that the legislature may attach to the offense, such as registration 
requirements for convicts. 
Although other factors may contribute to the penalty of the crime, 
“primary emphasis . . . must be placed on the maximum authorized period of 
incarceration,”7 and the sentence required for the constitutional guarantee of a 
jury trial is more than six months.8  Aggregation of crimes tried within a single 
trial, with a possible consolidation producing a maximum sentence of over six 
months, does not authorize the right to a jury trial.9  Despite this time-based 
standard, a defendant may overcome the presumption that a sentence less than 
six months indicates the petty nature of the crime by demonstration that 
“additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum 
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a 
legislative determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.”10 
B. Control of the Right to Jury 
The text of the Constitution seems to denote a right to a jury trial vested 
solely in the defendant.  However, case law has shown that this right may be 
vested in the court or prosecutor as well.  This issue derives from discussion of 
the ability of a defendant to waive the right of a jury trial in the U.S. criminal 
courts.  In all practicality, defendants’ waivers are almost always accepted by 
courts.  In principle, however, a prosecutor or court may insist on a jury trial.  
Courts have taken the position that “there is no federally recognized right to a 
criminal trial before a judge sitting alone, but a defendant can . . . in some 
instances waive his right to a trial by jury.”11  Just what this waiver is 
conditional upon varies from state to state, with some making waiver 
contingent upon approval of the prosecutor, some making the court’s approval 
a prerequisite for waiver, while still others leave the decision completely to the 
 
 5. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 542. 
 8. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974). 
 9. Id. at 515. 
 10. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. 
 11. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965); see also State v. Dunne, 590 A.2d 1144 
(N.J. 1991) (applying Singer rule to New Jersey state courts). 
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informed discretion of the defendant.12  Although the ability of a court or 
prosecutor to claim a right to a jury trial differs by state, these contingencies 
have been held constitutional and are reflected in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) permits prosecutors to 
exercise discretion in protesting the waiver of a jury trial without justification 
of their reasoning.13 
C. Manipulation of Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of a jury trial may not be manipulated by prosecutors’ 
charging policies in the U.S. courts.  The sole influence of a prosecutor’s 
charging policies that may affect the right to a jury trial would be in charging 
defendants with lesser crimes, so as to avoid the attachment of the right.  Case 
law has also protected the right to a jury trial from potential manipulations on 
the part of judges.  A judge may not, for example, “strip a defendant of the 
right to a jury trial for a serious crime by promising a sentence of six months or 
less” because  “opprobrium attaches to conviction of those crimes regardless of 
the length of the actual sentence imposed.”14  Hence, charging policy or 
judicial sentencing choices have little effect on the right to a jury trial in the 
United States. 
II.  COMPOSITION OF THE JURY 
Although the traditional notion of a jury trial in the United States criminal 
justice system is a twelve-member panel of citizens, twelve members are not 
always essential.  In a 1970 landmark decision, the Supreme Court upheld the 
use of a six-person jury for criminal jury trials in state courts.15  The Court 
subsequently designated six as the minimum number of jurors necessary to 
safeguard the guarantee of impartiality in the Sixth Amendment right to 
criminal jury trials.16  State law typically imposes a similar limitation.17  
Inspiring these decisions were social science studies which found that a jury of 
less than six people hinders group deliberation, is detrimental to the defense, 
and decreases the likelihood of accurate minority representation from the 
community.18 
Just what number of jurors states choose between six and twelve varies 
greatly, sometimes depending on the seriousness of the offense charged.  Most 
 
 12. Singer, 380 U.S. at 36, 37. 
 13. Id. at 37. 
 14. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 341 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 15. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
 16. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
 17. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hunter v. District Court, 634 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1981). 
 18. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232. 
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states require twelve-members for felony trials, despite the Supreme Court’s 
invitation to lower the number.  A few states allow juries of six (e.g., 
Connecticut, Florida) or eight (e.g., Arizona) to sit on a felony case, while still 
others allow six-member juries for felony trials in courts of limited 
jurisdiction, requiring twelve-members only in general jurisdiction courts (e.g., 
Indiana, Kentucky, and Massachusetts).19  Over half of the states use six-
member juries for misdemeanors, while others specify some number between 
six and twelve (e.g, Ohio specifies eight, Virginia requires seven).  Where 
states allow for twelve-member juries, a defendant may also waive this right in 
favor of a smaller jury. 
A related issue to jury size is whether a jury must be in complete 
agreement in order to render a verdict.  Jury unanimity is required in all federal 
criminal trials under the Sixth Amendment.20  Yet the Supreme Court has held 
that the Federal Constitution does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state 
courts,21 although only two states currently allow non-unanimous convictions 
(Louisiana and Oregon).22  The possibility of non-unanimous jury verdicts call 
into question the relationship between jury size and the unanimity requirement.  
The Supreme Court decided that six-member juries are permitted in state 
criminal cases only if their verdicts are unanimous.23 
III.  ROLE OF THE LAY JUDGES IN THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE 
A. Trial Procedure 
The criminal justice system in the United States is adversarial in nature.  
Both the government’s counsel and defense counsel may present witnesses and 
evidence for consideration by the finders of fact.  A professional judge 
determines admissibility of the evidence based on statutory evidence rules.  
The evidence is then used by the jury for consideration of fact issues as the 
trial progresses.  In a criminal jury trial, there are two true finders of fact––the 
professional judge and the jury.  The judge plays an initial, very limited fact-
finding role by determining which facts are relevant and thus will be presented 
to the jury.  The judge is further able to reverse a jury determination of guilt if 
she deems it against the weight of the evidence.24  The judge also decides 
 
 19. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, 
AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS, 1395-96 (1998). 
 20. JUDGE NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES, 8-8 (1997); see 
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). 
 21. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
 22. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1466. 
 23. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979). 
 24. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 70 (1988). 
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which type of verdict the jury will be allowed to render.  This verdict can take 
one of two forms––that of a general verdict consisting of guilt or acquittal, or a 
specific or “special” verdict, consisting of a series of specific factual questions 
which the judge then applies to the law.25  Traditionally, the jury is presumed 
to decide factual disputes based on evidence presented by the parties, then 
apply those facts to law provided by the judge in her instructions.26  Four 
states, Georgia, Oregon, Maryland, and Indiana, formally give their jurors 
authority to decide questions of both fact and law in their state constitutions, 
though apparently only the latter two will give juries instructions on their 
power to nullify, or to choose not to apply law.27 
The adversary model leaves duties of fact investigation, witness and expert 
interviews, and case presentation to the two adversarial parties.28  The judge 
and jury then impartially adjudicate the issues raised by the conflicting 
presentations of evidence by the parties.  The system in the United States is 
termed a “modified” adversary system, as the judge is not completely silent 
concerning what the jury may consider.29  The policy underlying the use of the 
adversary system in the United States is protection of individual autonomy and 
appropriate portrayal of the relationship between the individual and the state.30 
The role of the jury members in the trial is one of observance and 
deliberation, not of active participation and questioning.  When jurors are 
permitted to question witnesses, their questions are filtered through the judge 
by procedural protections usually consisting of jury submission of questions to 
the judge, followed by notification to counsel of the contents of the questions 
and an opportunity for them to comment or object to the questions.31 
Victim participation is also relatively limited in this adversary system.  A 
victim may not bring a civil suit within the criminal trial, although he or she 
may use evidence gleaned from the criminal investigation to support a 
contemporaneous or subsequent civil action.  Victims have no representation in 
the criminal trial and, likewise, take no part in jury selection, questioning of 
witnesses, presentation of evidence, or oration of arguments.  Recent years, 
however, have seen a movement toward a system more generous to victims’ 
rights.  Currently, victims have some rights to participate at the sentencing and 
plea bargaining stages of the trial process.  Some critics strive for inclusion of 
victim input into the charging decision, as this would increase victims’ feelings 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1469. 
 27. Id. at 1470. 
 28. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 35 (2d ed. 1992). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 36. 
 31. GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 20, at 9-3, 9-4. 
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of vindication.32  However, in the interests of protection of prosecutorial 
discretion, even these critics limit their promotion to a victims’ right to be 
heard but not a right to determine the substance of the charging decision 
itself.33 
The 1980s witnessed an unsuccessful movement, headed by President 
Ronald Reagan and his Task Force on Victims of Crime, to change the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution, adding a victim’s right to be present and heard 
at all critical stages of judicial proceedings in every criminal prosecution.34  
Though nationally the movement gained little ground, at the state level victims 
now enjoy more participation by way of notification of dates and decisions, 
participation via “victim impact statements” at the sentencing stage, which tell 
objectively and subjectively the impact of the crime on the victim and those 
close to them, and greater opportunities for victim restitution.35  The most 
controversial of these protective mechanisms is the use of “victim impact 
statements,” which were not well received by the courts until the Supreme 
Court approved their use in 1991.36  State provisions like these are greatly 
varied and enforcement of them is extremely problematic.37 
B. Questions of Law and Sentencing 
As discussed above, jurors in the United States criminal justice system 
have the power to decide issues of fact, leaving questions of law for the judge.  
Controversy surrounds this idea when discussed in relation to the possibility of 
“jury nullification.”  This authority has been described as the “power of a jury 
to soften the harsh commands of the law and return a verdict that corresponds 
to the community’s sense of moral justice.”38  Because juries’ acquittal 
verdicts are unreviewable by the trial or appellate courts, and because criminal 
juries return general verdicts of guilt or innocence rather than specific findings 
of fact, juries have the power to decline to apply law to facts that the law 
clearly governs.  Most courts deal with the supposed illegitimacy of this action 
by refusing to instruct jurors of this power and preventing attorneys from doing 
 
 32. Sarah N. Welling, Victims in the Criminal Process: A Utilitarian Analysis of Victim 
Participation in the Charging Decision, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.  85-86 (1988). 
 33. Id. at 116. 
 34. Valerie Finn-DeLuca, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 403, 406 
(1994). 
 35. Id. at 407. 
 36. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 37. Finn-DeLuca, supra note 34, at 408. 
 38. Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. VanDyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury 
Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 165 (1991). 
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so as well, and there is little evidence of regular or widespread patterns of 
nullification.39 
Proponents of jury nullification instructions state that such instructions will 
“reinforce our nation’s commitment to a government where the people are 
sovereign, and it would serve to bring the people and their laws together in 
closer harmony.”40  The Supreme Court, however, has rejected such reasoning 
and has forbidden nullification instructions in federal trials: 
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is 
the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that 
law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.  Upon the court rests 
the responsibility of declaring the law; upon the jury, the responsibility of 
applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe 
them to be.41 
The jury’s role in sentencing is likewise limited.  American criminal courts 
sentence through use of a bifurcated system, in which one decision process 
determines guilt, followed by a separate proceeding to determine punishment.  
Juries generally have no authority to sentence in most American jurisdictions.42  
One exception to this rule is capital cases.  In these trials, jurors typically 
provide at least a recommendation as to whether the defendant will receive life 
imprisonment or the death penalty. 
IV.  FACTUAL AND LEGAL QUESTIONS JURORS DECIDE 
In the United States, jurors determine facts and apply the law to the facts, 
rendering a general verdict of guilty or not guilty.  “Special verdicts,” 
comprised of lists of factual questions to be answered by jurors and 
subsequently applied to law, are not favored in criminal cases.43  This 
preference for the simple decision of guilt or innocence is primarily based 
upon the idea that a series of questions may pressure jurors to decide purely 
based on logic, rather than allowing the verdict to reflect the conscience of the 
community that they purport to represent.44  The jury is generally not allowed, 
at least in practice as discussed previously in discussion of jury nullification, to 
decide which laws to apply to the facts.  The judge provides the law on which 
jurors are to base their decisions through jury instructions, consisting of a 
 
 39. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1474. 
 40. Scheflin & VanDyke, supra note 38, at 183. 
 41. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). 
 42. In a few states, such as Virginia and Kentucky, the jury is given a limited power to set 
the sentence after a conviction, see MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1620. 
 43. 26 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 631.03[1] (3d ed. 2001). 
 44. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 1050. 
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combination of standard jury instructions and a few customized instructions 
that parties may suggest.45 
Jury instructions may be given prior to trial, during trial, or at the close of 
evidence presentation, either before or after closing arguments.  The timing of 
instructions is normally left to the discretion of the judge, as is illustrated by 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, although instructions are nearly always 
given at end of the trial, after the close of the evidence.  Instructions in theory 
are to be simple, impartial, clear, and concise representations of the governing 
law of the jurisdiction concerning the legal issues raised by sufficient evidence 
in the cases of both the prosecution and defense, although there has been 
extensive criticism that instructions are too long, confusing or unclear.46  
Counsel for either party may submit proposed instructions in the “charge 
conference” of the trial, and the trial judge makes the final decisions on what 
instructions to give the jury.47  Parties may object to proposed instructions 
outside of the hearing of the jury. 
Federal courts, as well as most state courts, use pattern jury instructions 
from their jurisdiction that they may modify for particular trials.  Whether 
juries receive instructions orally or in writing varies, depending upon the 
jurisdiction and, sometimes, the judge’s discretion.48  Some states require 
written copies of instructions only in felony cases (e.g., Virginia).49  Much is 
left to the discretion of judges in criminal jury instruction, such as the choice to 
clarify confusing instructions, the basic instructions the jurors will receive, and 
the wording of those instructions.50 
The burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution to prove all 
elements of the crime charged “beyond a reasonable doubt.”51  Though the jury 
must be informed of this standard, the meaning of this phrase need not 
necessarily be explained.52  State courts and federal circuit courts have adopted 
a wide range of positions on defining this standard of proof.  Similarly, though 
the phrase “presumption of innocence” need not be used, the idea that a 
 
 45. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1457. 
 46. See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK, ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 
(1982). 
 47. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (“any party may file written requests that the court instruct the 
jury on the law as set forth in the requests”). 
 48. See United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 537, 538 (8th Cir. 1972); 22 MOORE ET AL., 
supra note 43, at ¶ 51.10. 
 49. EMANUEL EMROCH, VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.03 (2d ed. 1990). 
 50. 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, at ¶ 630.10. 
 51. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 52. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1507. 
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defendant is innocent until proven guilty is a required jury instruction in most 
cases, unless other instructions make the concept clear by implication.53 
A related issue is the burden of proof as to affirmative defenses raised by 
defense counsel during trial.  Should sufficient evidence be presented at trial, 
the judge will inform jurors of the proper standards of proof regarding these 
defenses.  In general, there are two burdens to consider––the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion.  The burden of production is on the 
defendant to present some evidence in support of the defense, bringing the 
issue before the court.54  In federal courts, the subsequent burden of persuasion 
has been held to rest on the defendant as well, if the defense does not negate 
any element of the crime.55  States vary in their treatment of this issue, with a 
few modern codes placing the burden of persuasion on the prosecution as to all 
issues, whereas others leave the issue for the courts to decide on a defense-by-
defense basis.56 
Courts frequently leave to the discretion of the judge whether to advise 
jurors not to consider sentencing when deciding guilt.57  Examination of 
pattern jury instructions reveals vast variation within substance of instructions.  
In most non-capital cases, the jury’s job is complete once it renders a verdict 
on guilt.  In a minority of jurisdictions, jurors may be retained for the 
sentencing stage of the trial. 
V.  DELIBERATION AND DECIDING QUESTIONS OF FACT, LAW AND GUILT 
Professional judges may not participate in the deliberations in the jury 
room, even to instruct jurors on the law.  Nor may jurors request, during 
deliberation, that the evidentiary portion of trial be reopened.  When jurors 
request that documents or physical evidence be brought to the jury room, 
judges are sometimes hesitant to allow this within their discretion due to the 
possibility that allowances may add weight to this evidence when compared 
with the other evidence presented at trial.58  Around one-third of the states 
have statutes or court rules which require the judge to honor such a request, but 
these policies vary between mandatory and discretionary allowance.59  Jurors 
are rarely able to bring taped or written accounts of the trial into the 
 
 53. 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, at ¶ 630.21.  Compare Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 
786 (1979) (presumption-of-innocence instruction not constitutionally required in every case), 
with Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (constitutional violation for failing to instruct on 
presumption-of-innocence with other instructions were minimal). 
 54. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 52 (2d ed. 1986). 
 55. Id. at 54. 
 56. Id. at 55. 
 57. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4 (1987). 
 58. GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 20, at 9-4. 
 59. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 1043. 
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deliberation room, perhaps due to a concern that deliberations would be 
lengthened considerably and that the cost of immediate transcription would be 
high.60  There is no minimum or maximum jury deliberation time, although 
after lengthy deliberations, juries may decide that they are unable to reach a 
unanimous decision; the judge may at that point declare the jury hung and 
order a mistrial.  In these cases, a new jury can be empaneled and the state may 
retry the defendant. 
VI.  THE JUDGMENT 
Professional judges may occasionally set aside a jury’s guilty verdict if the 
judge finds the verdict clearly against the weight of the evidence.61  The judge 
may set a new trial, but may not substitute a different guilty verdict or qualify 
the jury’s verdict. 
As noted above, American courts sentence defendants in a separate 
proceeding after the guilt determination.  Defendants have no constitutional 
right to a jury in sentence determination, and few states allow the juries a role 
except in capital cases.62  Florida, for example, allows jurors to recommend 
sentences in non-capital cases.63  A substantial number of jurisdictions also 
make limited use of jury sentencing in non-capital cases, such as for “special 
offender” sentencing or for special sanctions.  A few states make more general 
use of jury sentencing, such as providing for jury sentencing in all felony 
cases.  A fairly recent law review article noted eight states that allow juries to 
determine sentences in non-capital cases, primarily in the South (e.g., 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Virginia).64  Proponents of jury sentencing 
rely on justifications similar to those for jury nullification, such as the ideals of 
juries reflecting the common sense and community attitudes towards crime and 
punishment; whereas, opponents favor the arguments of greater education and 
recurrent experience used in judicial sentencing.65 
In capital cases, where most states allow jury participation in sentencing 
(although there is no constitutional right to capital sentencing by a jury),66 the 
jury must weigh mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances in 
coming to its decision between life imprisonment and a death sentence.67 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319-24 (1979). 
 62. 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, at ¶ 632.21[5][a]. 
 63. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1620. 
 64. Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso 
County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 (1994). 
 65. Id. at 18-19. 
 66. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984). 
 67. 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, at ¶ 632.21[6][b]; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 
1093. 
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When juries are involved in non-capital sentencing, they are generally 
allowed to set the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence of 
incarceration, staying within the upper-limit for the offense set by the 
legislature.  Minimum sentences are set by law.  Although bifurcated systems 
of trial are predominant in capital cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of unitary trials as well.68  Although a judge may have the 
authority in some cases to impose a sentence of death notwithstanding a jury 
recommendation of a life sentence, there may be special limitations on this 
procedure.69 
Four states have statutes allowing a judge to override the jury’s 
recommendation of life imprisonment and impose the death penalty (Florida, 
Alabama, Delaware, and Indiana).70 
VII.  APPEALS 
Except when the state has not had one clear and fair chance to convict, as 
in cases where juries were bribed, the prosecution can never appeal a not-guilty 
verdict.  “[W]e necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury’s verdict of 
acquittal—no matter how erroneous the decision . . . .”71  “A verdict of 
acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting a 
[defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.”72  A key 
reason the state might be denied its fair chance to convict would be if another 
party bribed or otherwise tampered with the jury, a crime under state and 
federal law.73 
Although the state cannot appeal an acquittal, the defendant can appeal a 
conviction on several grounds.  He can request either the trial judge or an 
appellate court to set aside the verdict as against the weight of evidence.74  In 
granting this motion, the judge is essentially saying that no reasonable jury 
could have convicted the defendant.  The trial judge’s decision on this motion 
is appealable by both sides.  Additionally, the judge’s instructions to the jury 
can be attacked as an erroneous statement of the law that improperly led the 
jury to convict; this provides a routine basis for defendants to challenge 
convictions.75 
 
 68. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1967). 
 69. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 1088. 
 70. LaTour Rey Lafferty, Florida’s Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should We 
Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment?, 23 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (1995). 
 71. Burks v. United  States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). 
 72. United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (quoting United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)). 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. IV 1992). 
 74. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 412-14 (1999). 
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In addition, defendants can collaterally attack the jury’s finding of fact 
through a writ of habeas corpus.76  Defendants can also challenge convictions 
based on other decisions the judge made during the trial, such as improper 
exclusion or admission of evidence, or permitting the prosecutor to make 
improper arguments to the jury.  Finally, convictions can be challenged under 
other constitutional rules not directly connected to the prosecution’s or judge’s 
actions at trial, such as the incompetence of defendant’s trial counsel,77 or 
because defendant’s indictment was issued by an improperly constituted grand 
jury.78 
In limited circumstances, verdicts can be overturned based solely on 
discovery of new evidence.  “The court on motion of a defendant may grant a 
new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice . . . .  A motion 
for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made 
only before or within two years after final judgement, but if an appeal is 
pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case.”79  In 
many state court systems, new trial motions based on newly discovered 
evidence is limited to a short post-verdict period.  In Virginia, for example, the 
motion for a new trial must be made within three weeks of judgment.80  In 
Virginia, absent such a motion, the only available remedy is a petition for 
habeas corpus in either state or federal court.81  In the federal courts, after two 
years have passed, the defendant may make a collateral attack on the judgment, 
but is required to show that the facts upon which the appeal rests “could not 
have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.”82 
Also, the common law writ of coram nobis is used to grant relief to a 
convict who seeks review of his case based on new evidence.  An essential 
requirement for the use of this writ is that the evidence was unknown and 
could not have been known to the defendant before or during his trial.83  
Because of the protection against double jeopardy, a judge has no power to 
order a new trial on his own motion; she can do so only in response to a motion 
by the defendant.84 
Appellate judges evaluate the minimal sufficiency of the evidence, but they 
do not otherwise re-evaluate the evidence itself.  Appeals based on 
 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (Supp. III 1997). 
 77. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(2). 
 79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. 
 80. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3a:15(b). 
 81. Woodfin v. Commonwealth, No. 1043-88-3, 1991 WL 832013, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. April 
2, 1991). 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2001). 
 83. 18 AM. JUR. 2d Coram Nobis § 2 (1985). 
 84. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1947). 
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insufficiency of the evidence are not de novo reviews of that evidence.  Either 
the trial judge, or an appellate court reviewing the conviction on direct appeal, 
may set aside a jury’s guilty verdict as against the weight of the evidence.85  
(Because the prosecution cannot appeal acquittals, appellate courts do not face 
analogous issues with respect to acquittals.)  Collateral appeals—review of the 
constitutionality of the conviction after direct appeals have been exhausted—
presume that the trial court fact-finding is correct, although the defendant can 
rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.86  Federal courts can 
review state court convictions through this mechanism, and states are also 
required to have an equivalent post conviction procedure within state court 
systems that is sufficient to review deprivations of constitutional rights under 
the Federal Constitution.  A writ of coram nobis is a traditional and adequate 
form of this post-conviction remedy.87 
 
 85. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319-24 (1979); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2001). 
 87. See AM. JUR.2D, supra note 83, at § 1. 
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VIII.  CIRCUMVENTING THE JURISDICTION OF THE JURY 
In the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions including the federal courts, more 
than ninety percent of all criminal charges are resolved through plea 
bargaining, without a trial.  Yet the rate of jury trials is typically much higher 
for serious offenses.  About forty percent of murder charges go to trial, and 
twenty-five percent of rape charges.  Despite the relatively low percentages, 
U.S. state courts still conduct nearly 100,000 jury trials a year.88  Moreover, 
the possibility of a jury trial affects many of the cases that are resolved through 
plea bargaining.  Attorneys and parties often negotiate terms in light of how 
they expect a jury would decide a case, and some prosecution offices explicitly 
evaluate charging decisions in light of predicted jury behavior.89  The practice 
of a  “plea discount”—an offer of a lesser sentence for pleading guilty than a 
defendant would receive if he insisted on a jury trial and was convicted—is 
widespread in American jurisdictions.  Because it is not a formal, explicit 
practice, however, it is difficult to measure.  Some estimates put the discount 
in federal courts at thirty to forty percent.  Constitutional law supports such 
efforts to discourage jury trials with strong presumptions that prosecutors offer 
bargains only for proper reasons and with rules that allow prosecutors to 
increase charges if defendants reject plea bargain offers.90 
IX.  WHO ARE JURORS AND HOW ARE THEY SELECTED?91 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed.”  The United States Supreme Court has interpreted “impartial 
jury” to mean that the jury pool, or venire, must be drawn by procedures 
 
 88. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1379-80 (reporting that in 1994, state courts 
conducted 98,883 jury trials). 
 89. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 5-7 (1994); MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, 
at 967 (statement of Philip Heymann, Attorney, to U.S. Congress, April 23, 1980) (describing 
charging policy of federal prosecutors that decisions not to prosecute may be made in part after 
assessing the prospect of jury nullification). 
 90. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (approving, under constitutional due 
process clause, prosecutor’s decision to increase charges after defendant rejected a plea bargain 
offer); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (1987); David Brereton & Jonathan Casper, Does It 
Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 45 (1981-82) (discussing plea discount practices). 
 91. The first portion of this section is based on, and borrows heavily from, Darryl K. Brown, 
The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 445, 448, 451-58 (1994) 
(reviewing HIROSHI FUKARAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND 
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 18, 45 (1993)). 
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designed to yield a fair cross-section of adult citizens in the community.92  This 
requirement covers all state as well as federal courts, and Congress adopted 
this as federal statutory policy.93  Thus, jurors need not meet any requirement 
for legal expertise or other education. 
United States courts have traditionally turned to two sources of citizen 
names to compose jury pool lists: voter registration rolls and, less often, driver 
registration records.94  Both are typically the most comprehensive single-
source lists available in most jurisdictions, but each has significant deficiencies 
with regard to inclusiveness and representativeness.  Neither is necessarily co-
extensive with a list of qualified jurors; one may be eligible for jury service 
and yet not be registered to vote, much less a licensed driver.  As a result, voter 
lists rarely meet the two goals of jury lists—inclusion of every eligible citizen 
and representation of all segments of the community.  For a variety of 
historical and social reasons, and because voter registration in the United 
States depends on voluntary efforts by the citizen, voter rolls typically under-
represent poor citizens and people of color.95  Voter rolls are estimated to 
exclude up to one-third of the adult population, skewing the jury pool to over-
represent the elderly and relatively affluent and to under-represent racial 
minorities. 
A minority of jurisdictions has made efforts to improve the 
representativeness of the jury wheel by supplementing voter rolls with other 
sources of citizen names, typically driver registration records.96  Yet driver lists 
also somewhat under-represent low-income citizens and racial minorities, as 
well as the elderly and women.  A few other source lists, such as public 
benefits records, property tax records, and annual local census data, are 
available but are not in widespread use and are likely to have comparable 
problems of under-inclusiveness.97 
 
 92. The traditional view of jury selection rests on the older, pre-cross-section vision of 
juries, which assumed that the best jurors are active, upstanding citizens of good moral character, 
and in that respect are an elite subgroup of the community. This pre-cross-section vision does not 
accord with the contemporary notion of impartiality that depends upon a representative cross-
section of citizens. 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994). 
 94. HIROSHI FUKARAI ET AL., supra note 91, at 18, 45. 
 95. Congress made its first significant effort to correct that under-representation with the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994), which eased restrictions on voter 
registration in a variety of ways.  Two decades after those reforms, however, Congress still 
recognized a need for the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994), to 
improve registration rates. 
 96. FUKARAI ET AL., supra note 91, at 46-47. 
 97. The problem of combining two or more source lists creates problems of name 
duplication that are surprisingly difficult to remedy; some jurisdictions have conceded their 
computer programs cannot eliminate all duplicate names. 
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Further, studies reveal extreme variations in representation of various 
neighborhoods, or census tracts, within a given judicial district; jurors are not 
summoned equally from all neighborhoods within the district.  For example, “a 
three-month study of jury representation in Los Angeles in 1985 revealed 
that . . . areas [within a defined judicial district] with high concentrations of 
racial and ethnic minority residents were systematically excluded from jury 
service.”98  Over the period of study of another locality near Los Angeles, half 
the jurors called lived in just thirty-five of the jurisdiction’s 538 census tracts–
–or 6.5% of the district.  On the other hand, 60.6% of the census tracts in the 
district (i.e., 326 tracts) had not one juror called from them; another 117 census 
tracts (21.7% of the district) had no more than four jurors called.99 
Virtually all American jurisdictions exclude certain groups of citizens from 
jury service.  Convicted felons are typically barred from juries, and many 
states exclude members of certain occupations, such as law enforcement 
officials, judges, lawyers or physicians.  Additionally, any citizen who asserts 
that she cannot be unbiased in a given case, either because of her knowledge of 
the parties, the circumstances of the case, or strong disagreement with the 
applicable law, will be excluded from service in a particular case (though not 
from jury service generally).100 
Once court officials summon a group of citizens for jury service, the 
parties are entitled to at least a minimal opportunity to obtain information from 
the jurors.  Practices regarding this questioning of jurors (known as “voir dire”) 
varies widely among jurisdictions.  Some courts allow the parties’ attorneys to 
question jurors extensively and individually; in others, the judge will conduct 
all questioning (or sometimes give jurors a written questionnaire for which the 
parties can submit questions) and keep the questions very limited.  Beyond this 
formal questioning in court and supervised by the judge, parties often may 
obtain jurors’ names before trial and typically are not forbidden to conduct 
their own investigations into jurors’ backgrounds.  State prosecutors frequently 
will check jurors’ criminal records (information which they sometimes are 
required to share with the defense).101  Private investigation by the defense 
occurs only in rare trials with wealthy parties.  In rare cases in which the court 
finds a risk of jury tampering or excessive publicity, federal rules, as well as 
those in many states, permit jurors to serve anonymously so that their identities 
 
 98. FUKARAI ET AL., supra note 91, at 30. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 35.16 (1989). 
 101. See Lance Salyers, Invaluable Tool v. Unfair Use of Private Information: Examining the 
Use of Jurors’ Criminal History Records by Prosecutors in Voir Dire, 56 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
1079 (1999) (surveying state laws). 
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are concealed from the parties.102  Even without jurors’ names, an industry of 
jury consultants serves wealthy parties who do demographic research on 
citizens in a given locality to aid parties in determining the type of jurors they 
may want to seek or avoid. 
After jurors have been questioned in court and immediately before they are 
impaneled for the start of the trial, parties may request that the court remove 
any jurors who are by law disqualified from serving on a particular case 
(because of an admitted bias or a close relation to the parties, witnesses or 
attorneys).  Finally, after the court has certified a group of potential jurors as 
qualified, the parties in all jurisdictions are granted a number of “peremptory 
strikes” (the number they are granted varies widely among states)103 which 
they may use to remove any qualified jurors whom they do not want on the 
jury.  The only limitation on use of peremptory strikes is that parties may not 
remove jurors based on racial or ethnic discriminatory intent.104  As one 
example of the effect of peremptory strikes, in 1993, about twenty percent of 
all federal jurors were excluded by peremptory strikes. 
Jurors are typically paid a small amount per day or week of service; fees 
vary widely by locality and seem to range from $5 to $50 per day.  Rules also 
vary widely as to how long a juror must serve beyond a single trial.  Some 
jurisdictions adopt a “one week or one trial” rule, meaning jurors are excused 
from service after either a single trial105 or a week of being in the jury pool 
called to the courthouse but not selected for a trial.  Other jurisdictions 
summon jurors to the courthouse periodically over several weeks, meaning that 
some jurors may serve on more than one trial in that period.  After that service, 
their names are returned to the jury list.  In theory citizens are unlikely to be 
summoned again soon for service, but in most jurisdictions their next period of 
service is a matter of chance and may occur in the same year or several years 
later. 
 
 102. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Berger, Jury Anonymity Is Seen as Pivotal Factor 
in Gotti’s Plea Talks, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1999, at B1 (federal court judge kept jurors’ names 
secret from the parties). 
 103. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1447 (surveying state laws and noting that in 
federal courts, defendants get ten strikes but the government only gets six). 
 104. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to bar racially 
discriminatory peremptory strikes by defendants); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415-16 (1991) 
(extending Batson so that any person, regardless of race, can raise a claim of racially 
discriminatory peremptory strikes); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (easing the 
evidentiary burden need to prove a claim of racially discriminatory peremptory strikes by a 
prosecutor, in violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
 105. Most jury trials are short, lasting one to three days.  In 1995 in federal courts, 42.8 
percent of the 7,421 jury trials conducted lasted a day or less; 16.8 percent took two days; another 
12.7 percent were completed in three days.  Only 1.5 percent took longer than 20 days.  See 
MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 1379-80. 
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X.  HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 
American jurisdictions, beginning in the colonial period, adopted the 
English common law tradition of juries for criminal trials.  The U.S. 
Constitution confirmed this tradition with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of 
a jury trial, with jurors from the locality in which the crime was committed.  
Although that right initially applied only to federal courts, all colonies (and 
later, all states) similarly guaranteed state court jury trials in their respective 
state constitutions.  Juries initially had broad authority to decide questions of 
law as well as fact, and sometimes received conflicting instructions—or no 
instructions—from judges.106  As noted above, although several state 
constitutions still say that juries “shall be the judges of the law and the facts,” 
the overwhelming U.S. practice is now that jurors apply law given to them by 
judges and otherwise make only fact decisions. 
XI.  EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JURY DECISION-MAKING107 
A large body of social science literature addresses a wide range of issues 
related to jury decisionmaking.108  A leading cognitive psychological model of 
jury decisionmaking—Pennington and Hastie’s “story” model—concludes that 
jurors selectively evaluate evidence and create intuitively coherent narrative 
structures, or stories, that allow them to make sense of evidence.  Once given 
the law and verdict categories by the judge, jurors seek the best match between 
the story representations of the evidence and their memories of verdict 
categories.  If it finds a “subjectively satisfactory” match, the jury renders a 
verdict.109  The story model suggests that jurors impose on the trial 
information––both relevant evidence and other available facts and social data–
–a narrative story organization.  That story is shaped by their knowledge of 
similar events––for example, knowledge of similar crimes, or similar patterns 
of human behavior––and by generic expectations about necessary story 
elements––for example, human motivations.110 
 
 106. ABRAMSON, supra note 89, at 22-45; Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief 
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994). 
 107. This section of the paper borrows heavily from Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, 
Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1216-38 (1998). 
 108. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983).  Much of this research relates to 
issues such as how credible jurors find eyewitness identifications, or how race, class, and gender 
differences affect assessments of credibility and other factfinding tasks. 
 109. Reid Hastie, Introduction to INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION 
MAKING 26 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). 
 110. Other researchers have reached similar conclusions using different research methods.  
Bennett and Feldman, drawing from their ethnographic studies of real jury trials, emphasize that 
jurors necessarily situate evidence-based stories within a preexisting social context that includes 
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There has been considerable empirical study of “extralegal” influences on 
jury decision-making, ranging from demographic factors––race, gender, age, 
economic status––to social attitudes and political ideology.  Many such factors 
affect, to varying degrees, which facts jurors remember or emphasize and 
which final judgments seem more plausible or preferable.  While such 
considerations are the stock-in-trade of trial lawyers’ jury-selection strategies, 
many correlate so weakly with verdict choices that they are ineffective 
predictors of juror behavior.111 
Case-relevant attitudes or ideological commitments probably affect 
decisions most strongly.  Ellsworth found in one study, for example, that 
attitudes toward capital punishment, which correlate with a collection of views 
about crime and the criminal justice system generally, subtly affect a range of 
small decisions that go into criminal-verdict choices.112  Such attitudes affect 
perceptions of the plausibility of witnesses, the availability of alternative 
cognitive “scripts” or stories for making sense of the evidence, the possibility 
of mistaken conviction, and the individual sense of how much doubt 
constitutes reasonable doubt.113  Such information and ideology seemed to 
affect verdicts by indirectly influencing the construction of a knowledge 
structure to interpret and summarize evidence of the case.114 
Two points about these findings are important here.  First, attitudes, though 
apparently stronger than demographic distinctions, have proven generally 
ineffective as predictors of final decisions because other factors––including 
evidence and trial procedures––suppress their controlling effects.115  Several 
studies confirm that when evidence is relatively strong, the influence on juries 
of legally irrelevant facts as well as moderate disagreements with substantive 
rules is minimal.116  The effect of such factors increases in close cases, but the 
variation in outcomes does not substantially differ from those the justice 
 
criteria for a coherent, plausible story of human conduct.  Their findings describe a contextual 
approach to reasoning that situates factfinding within preexisting assumptions about human 
conduct.  They find as well that jurors have a fairly consistent goal of reaching decisions 
consonant with notions of justice. 
 111. See Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1987) (summarizing research literature). 
 112. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE 
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 109, at 42. 
 113. See id. at 58. 
 114. See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information 
and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, 65-82 (1993). 
 115. See GUINTHER, supra note 24, at 57-58 (citing sources). 
 116. See, e.g., Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their 
Verdicts, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 781, 795-95 (1979). 
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system produces without the jury.117  More important, attitudinal and 
ideological biases are hardly limited to jurors, which diminishes their relevance 
for a specifically jury-focused theory of interpretation.  An extensive and 
growing body of political-science literature examines attitudinal influences on 
judicial decision-making, particularly in Supreme Court opinions.118  Like 
attitudinal studies of juries, research on judicial ideology suggests that judges’ 
political and social attitudes substantially affect decisionmaking.  Together, the 
research simply suggests that any human decisionmaker is significantly 
affected by ideological predispositions that legal training cannot suppress. 
Several studies have examined a topic closely related to ideological 
influences–– the effects of jurors’ notions of justice related to specific, factual 
scenarios.  Finkel tested whether popular attitudes regarding the felony-murder 
rule119 and accessory liability affected verdicts when jurors had to apply those 
two rules in a death-penalty prosecution.120  Two points are especially 
interesting.  First, Finkel identifies a widely held value––proportionality––
through which jurors apparently mediate the application of law.121  Second, he 
 
 117. See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976) (arguing from empirical 
evidence that legal outcomes consistently vary across forums and legal institutions with such 
legally irrelevant, social factors as the wealth or social status of parties); DONALD BLACK, 
SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989). 
 118. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983) (arguing from empirical data that judicial attitudes—personal 
values and backgrounds as well as regional customs—affect decisions, particularly in close 
cases); SHELDON GOLDMAN & THOMAS P. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 134-84 (2d ed. 1985); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: 
PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974) (describing an attitudinal 
theory of Supreme Court decision making); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal 
Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); see also GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 88-91 (1991) 
(recounting blatant judicial bias in legal interpretation on civil rights issues); id. at 332-35 
(describing lower courts’ resistance to criminal procedure mandates that conflict with local 
practices). 
 119. The felony-murder rule holds a defendant guilty of murder if an unlawful killing occurs 
during the course of a felony, whether or not the killing was intentional.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06, at 479 (1995). 
 120. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW 159-71 
(1995); Norman J. Finkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony-Murder and Community Sentiment: Testing 
the Supreme Court’s Assertions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 405 (1991); Norman J. Finkel & 
Stefanie F. Smith, Principals and Accessories in Capital Felony-Murder: The Proportionality 
Principle Reigns Supreme, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 129 (1993). 
 121. Discussing findings of proportionality sentiment, jurors apparently felt strongly that just 
outcomes required treating accomplices less severely than principal perpetrators in felony-murder 
scenarios, although criminal law dictates equal liability for them.  See FINKEL, supra note 120, at 
169-71. 
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identifies instruction language that changes many verdicts but does not fully 
control them in the sense of producing outcomes we would expect from 
uniform, literal application of legal rules.122  Thus, the study identifies jurors 
struggling between strong, widely held norms and conflicting criminal law 
rules, a struggle mediated by interpretation of instructions.  It seems some 
jurors resolve that tension by applying statutes literally and against personal or 
community preferences; others resolve it against literal application, by either 
ignoring the instruction or creatively interpreting it. 
Relatedly, Robinson and Darley recently have documented several 
contexts in which popular notions about what legal rules are or should be 
depart from common law rules or contemporary criminal codes.123  They 
found, for example, that most of their survey respondents––like Finkel’s mock 
jurors––would assign less liability to accomplices than principal perpetrators, 
in contrast to most criminal codes.124  Across a range of criminal law issues, 
including the role of harm and renunciation in attempts and failures to 
rescue,125 they found that subjects––just as Kalven and Zeisel detected among 
real jurors––make “more nuanced distinctions between similar but not identical 
cases” than criminal codes do.126  The findings show that individualized 
assessments of moral culpability, sensitive to circumstances and background 
norms, are not only a theoretical goal of criminal law, they are also part of the 
popular understanding of criminal law’s purpose.  Yet, the results of Robinson 
and Darley’s study do not mean people vote for personal outcome preferences 
 
 122. Jurors given a “conclusive presumption” instruction convicted defendants of felony-
murder more frequently than those who received a “nullification” instruction, which informed 
them they had the “final authority to decide whether or not to apply a given law,” to which they 
need only give “respectful attention.”  See Finkel & Smith, supra note 120, at 148 (reprinting 
instructions); id. at 153-154 (discussing experiment results). 
 123. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 13-51 (1995). 
 124. See id. at 41-42.  (for a similar finding in a mock-juror studies); FINKEL, supra note 120, 
at 154-71. 
 125. Robinson and Darley’s subjects gave weight to whether harm occurred, thus punishing 
criminal attempts less severely than completed offenses and allowing a renunciation defense for 
attempts that were nearly complete and for which most codes allow no such defense.  They also 
detected clear community sentiment for a rule requiring a higher threshold for attempt liability 
than the prevailing rule—that is, the actor must be in “dangerous proximity” of completing the 
crime rather than merely taking a “substantial step” toward completion.  Additionally, subjects 
supported liability for failing to rescue others in distress, though most codes impose no such 
liability.  See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 123, at 13-51. 
 126. See id. at 50.  As part of that inclination toward fine-tuned judgments, respondents also 
supported grading of offenses on a long continuum that distinguishes between offenses even more 
finely than the eight or nine grades of offenses now typical in most codes.  See  id. at 198. 
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when they become jurors.127  Assigned the role of juror, one may feel a 
stronger obligation to ignore personal sentiments and apply the legal rules 
conveyed through instructions fairly literally. 
Social science research has demonstrated that jurors do not consistently 
apply jury instructions literally.  One explanation for these findings is that 
jurors simply do not understand the instructions.128  They may not remember 
rules or statutory elements they are given through instructions, and they may 
misunderstand rules of which they have some memory, particularly if they 
have strong preconceptions about the alleged crime.129  Yet two qualifications 
are important.  First, the methodology used in some studies likely exaggerates 
the amount of miscomprehension.  Some of the studies that identify juror 
misunderstanding of statutes survey jurors individually at some point after they 
have been instructed and find significant errors in retention and comprehension 
by individuals.130  Yet, as Hastie has argued and supported with data, juries as 
a group likely understand instructions better than any single member does. 
Hastie’s study of a large set of mock juries found jury memory averaged 
slightly over eighty percent for information from judge’s instructions, if one 
credits a jury with recall of information that any one juror remembers.131  He 
also documented significant correction of jurors’ legal errors by other jurors 
during deliberations, a factor other studies did not explore.132 
 
 127. The purpose of Robinson and Darley’s study primarily was to identify popular consensus 
about the appropriate content of legal rules, which rule drafters could use to inform their revision 
of rules.  See id. at 215. 
 128. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 3-24 
(1982); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY, 121-24 (1986); Paul H. 
Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 170-75 (1994); Laurence J. 
Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply 
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153 (1982). 
 129. See David A. Schum & Anne W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded 
Inference in Jurisprudence, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION 
MAKING, supra note 109, at 168-72; Severance & Loftus, supra note 128, at 157-61, 194; Vicki 
L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509-11 (1993). 
 130. See Casper & Benedict, supra note 114, at 80; Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror 
Decision Process, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra 
note 109, at 88-89; Schum & Martin, supra note 129, at 168-170; see also ELWORK ET AL., supra 
note 128, at 3-24 (discussing problems with jury instructions in general). 
 131. See Casper & Benedict, supra note 114, at 81. 
 132. See id. at 80-81 (noting that individual jurors answered questions on instructions with 
thirty percent accuracy, but a “more meaningful examination of memory” found the jury’s 
collective memory of instructions was over eighty percent accurate); see also FINKEL, supra note 
120, at 283 (discussing empirical studies “show[ing] that jurors do not ignore or willfully 
disregard instructions but that they remember and comprehend them”). 
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More importantly, the blame for jurors’ lack of understanding lies to a 
significant extent with courts rather than juries.  Courts could substantially 
improve jury comprehension of instructions with two sorts of changes: 
rewriting them to reduce complexity and legal terminology, and improving the 
manner in which instructions are presented. Traditionally, jurors receive 
instructions orally from the judge at the end of trial and often cannot take 
written notes.133  Studies indicate comprehension could substantially improve 
if jurors received written copies of instructions to take to the jury room, if they 
received key instructions at the start as well as the end of the trial, and if 
instructions were written in shorter sentences using fewer arcane terms.134  
(Even Hastie’s findings are based on juries that received instructions in a 
manner now known to limit comprehension: jurors received instructions only 
once, and only orally from the judge.)135 
More generally, considerable evidence suggests that jurors are 
conscientious about and committed to following instructions and correctly 
applying rules, and they believe they understand most instructions.136  More 
 
 133. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A 
CASE STUDY 55-65 (1984) (discussing juror comprehension of instructions in a case that was 
tried to two juries because the first jury hung, with only the second jury receiving written copies 
of the instructions and pretrial, verbal instructions); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 89, at 91 
(describing “judges’ furious, quick-paced, jargon-laced set of instructions” to juries). 
 134. See AUSTIN, supra note 133, at 60-65 (noting that the instructions in the case under 
study averaged 102 words per sentence, while modern American prose averages twenty-one 
words and were written at a “sixteenth grade level” requiring graduate education to comprehend 
fully); ELWORK ET AL., supra note 128, at 3-24, 35-56; Joseph B. Kadane, Sausages and the Law: 
Juror Decisions in the Much Larger Justice System, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 109; Raymond W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: 
An Investigation into Juror Comprehension of Pattern Instructions, COMM. Q., 31, 32-35 (1978) 
(finding that jurors given pattern instructions show better comprehension of law than uninstructed 
subjects); Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979) (finding improved 
comprehension when instructions are rewritten); Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal 
vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1985) (finding that 
mock jurors’ decisions are affected by changes in burden-of-proof instructions); Vicki L. Smith, 
Impact of Pretrial Instructions on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 220 (1991) (finding that instructing jurors before as well as after trial 
improves juror comprehension). 
 135. See Hastie, supra note 109, at 17; Ellsworth, supra note 112, at 49-50; Schum & Martin, 
supra note 129, at 169; see also Smith, supra note 134, at 231 (recommending that jurors be 
given written copies of instructions and instructed more than once on key rules). 
 136. See GUINTHER, supra note 24, at 59 (concluding, based on new studies and a review of 
research, that “jurors generally attempt to follow all. . . instructions the judge gives them”); id. at 
73 (finding that most jurors surveyed “believed they understood ‘most’ of what the judge told 
them about the law, and they might not be wrong”); id. at 89 (reporting that forty-six percent of 
jurors said the law given by the judge was the most important factor in their decisions); id. at 100 
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important, the largest studies of real and mock jury trials find that jurors reach 
the result that lawyers and judges consider correct an overwhelming majority 
of the time.137  Thus, despite evidence of miscomprehension, jurors’ attempts 
to follow instructions are often generally successful.138  They appear to 
understand, as a group, enough of the law usually to render acceptable 
verdicts.139 
Several studies employing mock jurors have demonstrated that jury 
instructions have significant effects on verdicts, leading jurors to decisions 
different from ones they would reach with different instructions or none at all.  
Sanders and Colasanto tested the effects of general intent versus specific intent 
instructions on a set of mock juries deciding a case in which the defendant was 
accused of stealing from vacant property old bricks that he claimed to believe 
were abandoned.140  As they should, juries more frequently convicted the 
defendant under the general-intent instruction, which required only intent to do 
the act –– admitted by the defendant ––  rather than intent to violate the law.141  
Sanders and Colasanto concluded that “juries do use judicial instructions in 
deciding cases” and do feel constrained by the most restrictive instructions to 
convict despite personal sentiments.142  “[J]ury decision making appears to be 
more principled than when the effect of instructions is left unexamined” and 
generally “can be rational and principled.”143 
 
(reporting a survey of civil trial attorneys that found more than ninety percent agreed that jurors 
had grasped legal issues well). 
 137. See GUINTHER, supra note 24, at 73; Ellsworth, supra note 112, at 59-60 (finding most 
mock juries in a homicide trial reached a verdict of second-degree murder—the correct verdict, in 
the lawyers’ opinions—with manslaughter, the next most plausibly correct choice, occurring as 
the second most common verdict); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 
429-30 (1966) (finding nine percent of jury verdicts clearly incorrect). 
 138. See, e.g., HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 128; Diane L. Bridgeman and David Marlowe, 
Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
91, 97-98 (1979) (concluding that “the jury by and large does understand the case and get it 
straight and . . . the evidence itself is a major determinant”)  (quoting KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 
note 14, at 162). 
 139. See GUINTHER, supra note 24, at 102. 
 140. The fact pattern in this experiment was based on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246 (1952).  The general-intent instruction required the jury to find only that the defendant 
intended the act of taking the bricks, “and it is not necessary to establish that the defendant knew 
that his act was a violation of the law.”  The specific-intent instruction required the jury to find 
that the defendant “knowingly did an act that the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the 
law.”  See Joseph Sanders & Diane Colasanto, The Use of Judicial Instructions in Jury Decision 
Making 7-10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 141. See Sanders & Colasanto, supra note 140, at 12-13. 
 142. See id. at 13, 17. 
 143. Id. at 13, 17-18. 
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The seminal American study examining the effect of instructions on 
juries—the Chicago Jury Project’s experiments on the insanity defense—found 
that instructions had a significant effect.144  Tested with sixty-eight mock 
juries, the study found that juries given an insanity defense instruction based 
on the M’Naghten145 case returned guilty verdicts significantly more often than 
juries given a Durham146 instruction or an instruction with no legal standard, 
which presumably allowed community sentiment to provide the rule. 147  Jurors 
given the Durham instruction also deliberated longer.148 
 
 
 144. See RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 70-77, 184-85, 199 
(1967). 
 145. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), discussed in SIMON, 
supra note 144, at 8 (noting that “under the M’Naghten rule the defendant is excused only if he 
did not know what he was doing or did not know that what he was doing was wrong”).  For the 
instruction given to mock jurors see SIMON, supra note 144, at 45. 
 146. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), discussed in SIMON, supra note 
144, at 8 (noting the Durham rule “states that a defendant is excused if his act was the product of 
a mental disease or defect”).  For the instruction given to mock jurors, see SIMON, supra note 
144, at 45-46; see also id. at 72-73 (noting that the Durham instruction “produces a powerful 
difference in jurors’ verdicts” compared to the M’Naghten instruction). 
 147. The “standardless” instruction stated only: “[I]f you believe the defendant was insane at 
the time he committed the act of which he is accused, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
by reason of insanity.”  SIMON, supra note 144, at 46; see also id. at 72-73 (summarizing jury 
verdict data for different instructions). 
 148. See SIMON, supra note 144, at 75. 
